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On Value Transfer and the Obviews
Obvious (adj.)
 1580s, ‘frequently met with,’ from Latin obvius ‘that is in the way, 
presenting itself readily, open, exposed, commonplace,’ from obviam 
(adv.) ‘in the way,’ from ob ‘against’ (see ob-) + viam, accusative of via 
‘way’ (see via). Meaning ‘plain to see, evident’ is first recorded 1630s. 
Related: Obviously; obviousness.1
Imagine yourself in a green chamber: a room, in which every 
single piece of furniture, the walls, the floors, and all other objects 
are of precisely the same shade of green. Armchairs, tables, televi-
sion sets, pictures on the walls, window panes—even the shadows 
cast by (identically) green bulbs are of the same color as everything 
else inside. Your eyes are helpless. Devoid of any sense of certainty, 
you will clumsily grope about to avoid painful collisions with objects 
‘that are in the way.’ Even though they materially exist, despite 
their opacity, the contents of the room are anything but e-vide-nt: 
all your eyes can register is limitless greenness, as all-pervasive 
and as unsettling as the blackness of a photographic darkroom 
when the lights suddenly go off. ‘Plain to see,’ yet invisible: ‘A’=’A.’ 
Absolute identity precludes identification. To perceive anything 
as obvius—in the way—we need it to be obviews first.
This essay is about the relation between the obvius, obvi-
ous and obviews: a relation which becomes evident in light 
































 in the Global Context
donor- and acceptor-cultures. I am inclined to argue that American 
cultures do not need to be decoded in the global context—unless 
we choose to use the term ‘decoding’ as synonymous to ‘read-
ing.’ Both in the intellectual and in the material spheres, elements 
of American cultures remain ‘plain to see’ in almost every aspect 
of life on our fair planet: beginning with tacos and Argentinian 
beef on restaurant menus world-wide, through Facebook-inspired 
‘friendships,’ space-age technologies in our kitchens, multiculturalist 
tendencies in politics, or First Nations’ inspirations in modeling deep 
ecology—to rock-and-roll, credit cards and Diet Coke—American 
cultures               . Always-already. What’s to decode then?
seeing/difference
The fact that we often fail to see the markers of American cul-
tures as obvious—and indispensable—components of who we are, 
and that, just as frequently, we choose to see them as as obvius when 
it fits us, may be attributed to a peculiar ‘ocular condition’ of ours. 
To explain this, I must take the liberty of inviting you to participation 
in two more obviews experiments.
Imagine an absurd situation: picture yourself as an aficionado 
of lonely Sunday walks in scrap-metal terminals. At the same 
time, imagine being an utter ignoramus in matters of technology. 
Then—see yourself walking between enormous heaps of distorted, 

























Even though you are technically able to fish out individual shapes, 
you enjoy your exotic solitude: the heaps of scrap seem to flow 
by as you walk. Suddenly, by the end of the walk, you run into 
an acquaintance, who happens to silently share your strange habit. 
Embarrassed with the sudden encounter, eager to hide your some-
what unusual inclination, you seek to explain the rationale of your 
being there: even though all you have registered is an endless heap 
of scrap, you are more than likely to rack your brains for anything 
that could plausibly be of use to you and that the scrap terminal 
might offer. You will perform work of remembering to avoid being 
labeled as a raving lunatic. You remember, or you fantasize.
The situation changes should you meet the very same acquain-
tance digging in the scrap half way through your walk. Upon seing 
you, he (or she) triumphantly brags about his latest find: a brand-new 
camshaft, mint condition, that would cost several hundred dollars 
if bought in a store. You must hide your ignorance to share the spirit 
of the  joyful celebration of victory (and by that camouflage your 
lunacy), you verbalize your wish to see the find. Not because you are 
terribly interested in it, of course, but to figure out what a camshaft is 
and thus to be able to join in a sensible conversation that would allow 
you to avoid hard questions as to why you are there on a beautiful 
Sunday afternoon. Suspecting little or nothing, the acquaintance 
is delighted to show you his prize:
Still, the blank stare betrays you: you are technologically illiterate. 
The acquaintance, however, enters into a sharing mode—and tells 
you all you never cared to know about camshafts. Whether you 
























 in the Global Context
ing circular movement into horizontal movement, that the cams 
installed on the rotating shaft move the tappets, which in turn 
open and close valves, and that the cam itself is an ingenious device, 
whose egg-shape makes the whole process possible: 
Overwhelmed, you thank your enthusiastic companion, who hap-
pily returns to his work, glad to have found a kindred soul. Relieved, 
you continue toward the end of the terminal, yet, the formerly  non-
descript, homogenous scrap-metal yard has perceptibly changed. 
Much to your own surprise, wherever you look, you suddenly see 
camshafts of all shapes and sizes:
Amazed, you no longer watch your step. Awestruck by the plethora 
of camshafts in the yard, you trip, fall down, and hit your head against 
a particularly malicious camshaft. You lose your consciousness and, 
as a result, you suffer from a minor memory loss: only a few minutes 
of your memory vanish. Precisely, the minutes, during which you 
























A few minutes later you come to, and, rubbing your hurting 
head, you get up and keep on walking toward the end of the yard. 
Yet... looking to your left and right, all you see is the non-descript, 
homogeneous, scrap:
Camshafts have vanished, along with the de-FINI-tion that 
you have received from your joyful do-it-yourself acquaintance. 
Much like the green room, the scrap yard hides nothing: there are 
no ‘coded’ contents within it. Still, without the finis of the definition, 
incapable of telling where one ends and another begins, you cannot 
tell the difference between one object and another. You no longer 
see objects as separate. They blend.
Curiously, if one thinks of the central metanarratives of the Judeo-
Christian culture of the West, it is hard not to see the parallels:
{1:1} In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. {1:2} And the earth 
was without form, and void; and darkness [was] upon the face of the deep. 
And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.
{1:3} And God said, Let there be light: and there was light. {1:4} And God 
saw the light, that [it was] good: and God divided the light from the dark-
ness. {1:5} And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. 
And the evening and the morning were the first day. 
{1:6} And God said, Let there be a firmament in the midst of the waters, 
and let it divide the waters from the waters. {1:7} And God made the fir-
mament, and divided the waters which [were] under the firmament 
























 in the Global Context
{1:8} And God called the firmament Heaven. And the evening and the morn-
ing were the second day.2
Clearly, the Book of Genesis describes the beginnings as the begin-
nings of difference: the earth is without form, void, in darkness, 
and all-too-liquid. And thus, like anything lacking de-fini-tion, it must 
remain unimaginable, until it is divided/separated from the firma-
ment of the now capitalized Heaven. Only then, by the power 
of the imperative logos, does it begin to function as a perceivable, 
distinguishable entity. St. John’s  philosophical explanation to Genesis 
confirms this observation:
{1:1} In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, 
and the Word was God. {1:2} The same was in the beginning with God. 
{1:3} All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing 
made that was made. {1:4}3
Indeed: the memory loss causing the disappearence of the  defi-
nition of the camshaft results in its non-existence—or, at least, 
its unthinkability. Still, in light of the Judeo-Christian givenness 
to logocentrism manifest in our ultimate confidence in the Word/
word, unthinkability is tantamount to non-existence: after all, history, 
if not written down, is mere legend; agreements, if not officially 
signed, have no legal power; a PhD holder who has lost his or her 
diploma must seek to obtain a duplicate before he or she can be 
considered for a position. Marriages would be invalid without the for-
mulaic performative act of speech, whereby someone pronounces 
two people man and wife. The removal of words legitimizing facts, 
in writing or in speech—undoes these facts. More generally, it seems 
justifiable to claim that If we cannot picture the de-fini-tional limits 
of an entity or a fact, we cannot think it. That, which does not differ, 
cannot be de-fined, and therefore cannot be thought. If we cannot 
think it, its existence is null and void. Unthinkable, however, does 
not mean coded. The fact that we cannot see, does not automatically 
2. The Book of Genesis, The King James Version of the Holy Bible, <http://
d23a3s5l1qjyz.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/King-
James-Bible-KJV-Bible-PDF.pdf> (access: 10 August 2013).
3. The Gospel According to St. John, The King James Version of the Holy Bible, 
<http://d23a3s5l1qjyz.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/
























mean it has been hidden from us, ciphered, that it is not blatantly 
‘in the way,’ that it is not opaque. Even if I cannot think it, my failure 
to do so is not necessarily a result of coding: it may well be the effect 
of my optics: the optics that I unwittingly—or consciously—adopt.
columbus and the shark
When uninitiated readers look at the image above, (mis)led 
by preconceptions as to how one should look at images, they will 
probably see nothing but a rectangle of irregular greenness. Following 
interpretive norms driven home by the ‘standard’ foreground-back-
ground distinction, they will probably scan the surface of the image 
in a frustrated search for something to see. Failing to achieve this, 
they may skip over the inconvenience, or jump the shark, resort-
ing to a more ‘complex’ hermeneutic procedure in order to explain 
the function of the image in this article to themselves and to others, 
who might denude their ophtalmological impotence. A more care-
ful reader, however, will suspect that the image may be more than 
a blatant allusion to the ‘green room’ experiment from the beginning 
of this text. They will perform work.4 They will read the footnote 
at the bottom of this page, seeking instructions. They will learn 
to look. The shift of the focal point beyond the image itself will 
eventually allow them to see what ‘standard’ procedures of image 
reading must inevitably render unavailable. Yet, once the readers 
see what is to be seen, they will realize that it is not coding that 
is responsible for the initial perceptive failure. Rather, it is what we 
ourselves bring into the picture.
4. I have generated the image above using the Easy Stereogram Builder 
























 in the Global Context
All of the experiments above bring us to the point when the issue 
of the dynamics between relational epistemology (responsible 
for our capacity of seeing) and good will (responsible for our readi-
ness to mistrust optics) becomes central. The first case could be 
conveniently illustrated by an experience of ‘falling into a language,’ 
an experience shared by many of us, speakers of English as a foreign 
language, especially if our adventure with the language commenced 
in the context of cultural isolation from the West.
Born and raised in Poland under the communist rule, I started 
learning English rather late: I was as old as nineteen when I mas-
tered a sufficient command of the language to have a relatively 
uncomplicated conversation. At the time, bearing in mind the severe 
limitations of travel and an almost complete lack of access to English-
speaking media, few Poles would honestly believe in any pragmatic 
uses for English in Poland. Yet, as a gesture of disobedience toward 
the dominant regime, as a tool of resistance and a harbinger 
of a brighter future, learning English would be a sine qua non of proper 
education of children born to intellectual families. What is more 
important, subcutaneously, even the high school teens would feel 
that English equaled status: you would play hookey in any other 
class, but not English.
Yet, despite positive attitudes and keen interest in anything 
related to English, the limited value transfer between the English-
speaking world and Poland at the time resulted in the fact that my 
generation would effectively form an almost English-free epistemic 
framework of reference. Value judgments aside, such a state of affairs 
carried certain consequences: above all, our ‘falling into the language’ 
would lead to much more spectacular discoveries than is the case 
with high school students today, for whom international travel is 
daily bread, who have been raised in houses with internet access 
and several hundred television channels in English to choose from, 
and for whom English has been a mandatory subject since preschool.
To my generation, seeing the difference upon falling into language 
was easy: I remember the sudden change of my musical tastes 
when I finally got to the point when I could understand the lyrics 
of songs performed by some of my formerly beloved rock’n’roll 
bands. My memory of the disappointment at the poetic quality 
























to Pink Floyd, King Crimson and Alan Parson’s Project for instant 
consolation. Moreover, even the simplest objects would sometimes 
manifest their nature as fascinating stereograms. For instance, this: 
An object like any other... with one exception. Until my ‘fall into 
language,’ I would understand the word spelled out on the cover 
as the name of the object. Especially, that it has been grammatical-
ized in the Polish language as a noun: the word ‘notes’ has seven 
case forms, can be diminutized, or motivate word formation. Even 
today it functions as such: any Polish-English dictionary will define 
it as ‘notebook,’ ‘jotter,’ ‘pocketbook,’ or ‘scratchpad.’ Discovering 
that ‘notes’ is actually an English word, and that the notebooks 
in English speaking countries had the same word spelled out on their 
covers changed my world: I was plainly amazed at my discovery that 
the obvious ‘notes’ of mine was a ‘book’ to my English speaking 
counterparts, and that the word on the cover was a plural form 
of the word ‘note,’ thus denoting its contents rather than itself. 
With a mighty bang, the opposition between the object and its con-
tents underwent a spectacular deconstruction: the world manifested 
itself to me as multidimensional and in constant freeplay: I may 
prefer to read it in English, I may prefer to read it in Polish, but I cannot 
deny the awareness of both. And unless we choose to insist that 
the ‘code was cracked’ when I fell into English, the multidimensional-
ity of the wor(l)d thus uncovered was not a result of some sinister 
























 in the Global Context
language, which changed my optics, which, consequently, changed 
my episteme and effectively transformed my doxa.
When no alternative episteme challenges our doxa, we seem 
to have no other option but to take what we see at face value. 
The ethical question that surfaces, however, is whether our lack 
of awareness may be construed as a viable justification of violence 
we may unwittingly be inflicting on others and, consequently, on our-
selves. Whether or not we subscribe to a certain politics of knowledge 
is ultimately our choice—and choosing to neglect the awareness 
that there might be alternatives to our own framework of refer-
ence is a function of will: ill will. When Columbus first encountered 
the Taínos, he brought into the picture his will to conquer, which 
effectively allowed him to read them thus:
All of them alike are of good-sized stature and carry themselves well. 
I saw some who had marks of wounds on their bodies and I made signs 
to them asking what they were; and they showed me how people from 
other islands nearby came there and tried to take them, and how they 
defended themselves; and I believed and believe that they come here 
from tierrafirme to take them captive. They should be good and intel-
ligent servants, for I see that they say very quickly everything that 
is said to them; and I believe that they would become Christians very 
easily, for it seemed to me that they had no religion. Our Lord pleasing, 
at the time of my departure I will take six of them from here to Your High-
nesses in order that they may learn to speak...5
Of course. Columbus choosesto neglect the fact that the language 
of gestures used by the Taínos might take some time to learn; 
he chooses to interpret these gestures as indicative of the proximity 
of the continent; he choosesto see in the natives ‘good and intel-
ligent servants’ rather than the masters of their own land on rather 
slippery grounds of their capability to ‘repeat what is said to them,’ 
he chooses to see the absence of religion by neglecting the very likely 
possibility of interpreting ceremonies unlike his own as manifestations 
of a system of spiritual beliefs, which choice, conveniently, invites 
the obvious solution of filling in the gap with Christianity, and that 
further legitimizes the conquest. Eventually, he ousts the Taínos 
5. Christopher Columbus, Journal (entry for Thursday, Oct. 11th 1492) 
<http://www.swarthmore.edu/SocSci/bdorsey1/41docs/01-col.html> 
























from the space of culture by denying their form of communication 
the status of a language: he has already made a decision to ‘take 
six of them’ back to Spain ‘in order that they may learn to speak.’ 6 
He chooses to adopt an optics best fit for his own political ends. 
Columbus chooses not to perform the work necessary to see what 
stares him in the face: to him, what he could see would be too 
obvius to be obviews.
Unsurprisingly, the ill will characterizing the whole of the colonial 
discourse will manifest itself all too often in the context of encoun-
ters, in which it is more than likely that an ophtalmological change 
would allow one to see what one allegedly craves to see:
When the Spaniards discovered this land, their leader asked the Indians 
how it was called; as they did not understand him, they said uic athan, 
[or: uuyik a t’aan] which means ‘what do you say’ or ‘what do you speak’ 
that ‘we don’t understand you.’ And then the Spaniard ordered it set 
down that it be called Yucatan.7
The Spanish commander insists on seeing ‘a notes’ even though 
he cannot but realize that ‘the notes’ would be a more appropri-
ate grammatical choice in the context. The genius loci of Yucatan 
is that of the assumption not to see alternative grammars orga-
nizing the wor(l)d—a choice made in ill will and with a particular 
political agenda in mind. Yucatan obliterated that, which must 
now remain unnameable. Columbus was able to see the shark 
beyond the two dimensions of the greenish rectangle he faced. 
Unlike Bartolomé de las Casas, he chose not to.
donor cultures, acceptor cultures: value transfer
If the history of the Spanish conquest of America is a history 
of a violent donor and an unwilling acceptor of values, it only serves 
to illustrate a much more persistent phenomenon: what once could 
6. See: Tadeusz Rachwał, ‘Tłumacz porwany (O przekładzie w dyskursie ko-
lonialnym),’ in Obyczajowość a przekład, ed. Piotr Fast (Katowice: Śląsk, 1996). 
See also: Tadeusz Rachwał, ‘O politycznych skutkach nieadekwatności 
przekładu, czyli dlaczego ugotowano kapitana Cooka,’ in Polityka a przekład, 
ed. Piotr Fast (Katowice: Śląsk, 1996). 
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be attributed to the ill will of the ‘unseeing’ conqueror who, following 
the Word, would ‘be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, 
and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over 
the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon 
the earth,’ thus legitimizing optics which gave free rein to greed 
and power hunger, is not always as simple today. The more obvious 
cases have already been discussed in RIAS by numerous scholars, 
who would address the neocolonial wars of the past decades, the mar-
ginalization of the ethnic cultures of the Americas, or the centrality 
of the US in the context of American Studies. What is much less 
obvious is how the very idea of coding/decoding American cultures 
may in itself be a result of choosing not to see the obviews if what 
we could see might manifest itself as too obvius for our liking.
Let me begin the final part of this essay with a few naïve questions. 
First: I am Polish and—as a Polish person—I am rather partial 
to potatoes, which, next to pork chops and cabbage, are fundamental 
to Polish cuisine. Does the fact that it has never crossed my mind 
to delve into the history of the potato and trace it back to Peru 
and Bolivia make it a ‘coded’ element of American culture? Have 
I ‘decoded’ it as such by making such an effort? Has the potato 
lost its status as an important component of the national culinary 
tradition of Poland because the vegetable was introduced to Europe 
in the 16th century? Does Polish culture by definition mean ‘non-
American’? What ‘code’ do I need to crack to ‘decode’ the potato 
as an element of American culture? Why do I choose an optics that 
allows me not to see it as ‘coded’ when it is tasty? Or is it that my 
taste has been subversively encrypted into me several centuries 
ago and I fail to see it?
Second: am I distrustful of communism as a result of the subver-
sive presence of ‘coded’ Red Scare mental protocols, or is it because 
friends of mine would be vanished from their apartments during 
the Martial Law of the 1980s? Would my present-day left-of-center 
orientation be attributable to the power of the ‘coded’ episteme 
borne out of the American Culture Wars of the same period?
Third: is the fact that Michał Kłobukowski translates The Color 
Purple as Kolor purpury (The Color Crimson), completely missing 
the reference of purple as the color of hope, and renders the Afri-
























foreignized Polish to be ‘decoded’ as white American racism, or is 
it perhaps a result of his failure to go beyond his own cultural 
prejudices and learn the grammar of the sociolect in its cultural 
and historical complexity?8 How may I know whether the racist 
optics is an element of American cultural coding or whether it is 
a fruit of the unique evolutionary path of the Polish culture before 
the transatlantic relations of Poland became intensive enough 
to allow for value transfer?
Fourth: when I choose to support feminist organizations 
and minority movements in Poland, is it because an American PC 
‘code’ is active, or is it because I would rather see everyone in my 
country breathe free air, which allows me to feel safer among less 
frustrated people? Does the fact that the right wing politicians 
world-wide choose to see feminism as an American import make 
it a ‘coded’ element of American culture, even though the phenom-
enon itself is as old as the hills?
The list of questions could, of course, continue. And, obviously, 
I can provide no definite answer to any of them, unless I choose 
to limit myself to either seeing ‘a notes’ or ‘the notes.’ I am, of course, 
disinclined to do so for two major reasons.
The first reason stems from my distrust with respect to any 
conceptual regimes taken for granted. Claiming that there is one 
global context in which American cultures could be ‘decoded’ rests 
upon the assumption that acceptor cultures and donor cultures are 
compatible enough for ‘codes’ to become invisibly interwoven into 
the texture of local metanarratives. Such an assumption is likely 
to lead to errors of judgment, whose consequences might be 
as serious as the Spanish conquest of America.
For example, when in November of 2008 in Katowice, Poland, 
Derick de Kerkhove held his debate dedicated to identity in the con-
text of the globality of the new media, he would warn his listeners 
about the peril of the loss of subjectivity. Atomized in a multiplic-
ity of nicknames, dissolved in the anonymity of the cyberspace, 
the human ‘self,’ de Kerkhove would suggest, would be increasingly 
8. See: Krzysztof Knauer, ‘Między kompetencją lingwistyczną a kulturową. 
Tłumaczenie odmian angielskiego na podstawie przekładu powieści Alice 
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at risk. He would, however, recognize his own speech as an instance 
of ‘coding’ when I asked him whether his argument would still be 
valid if we chose to include Buddhist cultures in his Western vision 
of ‘globality’: if ‘self‘ is illusory to some 600 million people, can we 
still talk of the ‘global’ peril of its dissolution? De Kerkhove revised 
his initial claim, arguing that, indeed, in philosophical terms his 
original proposition would be insubstantial in the context of Bud-
dhism, but that the cultural practice of the internet-ready Buddhist 
East demonstrates progressing westernization. Of course: the Chi-
nese or Thai Buddhists are not necessarily Buddhist monks, just 
as the European or American Christians are not necessarily Roman 
Catholic priests. The above notwithstanding, the representatives 
of the western cultures fall into despair, they do not fly into despair; 
they do not fall into joy when they are happy but are elated or grow 
wings, and they seat important guests to the right of the host—thus 
living the language that reflects the conceptual topography of heaven 
and hell and observe the protocol that emulates the biblical order 
of importance. Why should we assume that the Buddhist should 
function otherwise and forego the metanarrative basics of their 
daily routines due to the influx of new imports? Would the essential 
incompatibility of the Eastern and Western understanding of the ‘self’ 
not render the Americanness of those imports ‘plain text’? The sup-
posedly American ‘code’ of the culture of the Internet, pointed out 
by de Kerkhove’s concern, manifests itself in its failure as a ‘code’: 
it is the Westerners choosing to accept an episteme of Yucatan 
and project the fear of the dangers that the new media pose to their 
own concept of self upon cultures, whose rudimentary assumptions 
might not offer any conceptual space, in which such a ‘code’ could 
become active. Again, optics, not ‘coding.’ Only in this case, the accep-
tor culture adapts itself to new imports on its own, and including 
or rejecting them at will, choosing or refusing to add yet another 
dimension to its own identity. The donor culture, however, contin-
ues to fail to see the shark, which—in essence—is a choice. A choice, 
for which it may be accountable if the value at stake is not ‘digitized 
self,’ but, for instance, the ideas of freedom, liberation or happiness. 
The incompatibility of these concepts denudes American cultural 
‘codes’ as completely unencrypted messages, which all too often 
























This leads me to the second reason to look for the shark 
in the greenish rectangle rather than jump it. Driven, like Derick 
de Kerckhove, by the academic zeal to ‘protect’ others against 
the possible violence of the viral infection of other cultures with 
a ‘foreign DNA,’ we may end up inflicting more damage than allowing 
cultures to regulate themselves. To explain this point, it seems help-
ful to fall back upon the observations made by Itamar Even-Zohar, 
who, discussing the processes of value transfer between cultures 
in the context of translation, enumerates three basic situations 
in which the ‘import’ receives a primary position in the receiving 
system (Hrushovski and Even-Zohar, 1978: 24):
1) when a polysystem has not yet fully developed;
2) when a literature is ‘peripheral’ or ‘weak’ or both;
3) when there are turning points, crises or ‘literary vacuums.’
Each of these situations generates a context conducive to cul-
tural transfer from a dominant donor culture, over-producing values 
and transplanting them into acceptor cultures, not yet ‘saturated’ 
with values produced locally. Even though Even-Zohar’s observation 
concerns literary translation, I believe it may safely be expanded 
to include all other areas of cultural production, beginning with tech-
nology and finishing with law. Assuming the above, it is possible 
to argue that such a transfer, however, even though it always car-
ries consequences, does not have to be forceful, nor does it have 
to be covert or sinister. For instance, the aggressive expansionism 
of American corporate culture dominating weaker economies does 
take its toll on traditional small business, yet—for most of the cases—
such an import, along with the change in traditional work protocols, 
reorganization of traditional family life, revision of eating habits 
or dress code, brings in investments, new jobs, and an increase 
in a sense of stability in communities representing cultures recov-
ering from economic crises, or cultures whose development had 
been arrested as a result of a war or long-term isolation. Usually, 
central and local governments alike would solicit such investments, 
aware of the consequences of the butterfly effect. Undoubtedly, 
a corporation is not a charity organization. It operates on the prin-
ciple of desiring-machines: even though it ‘consists of humans,’ it is 
inhuman, and, if in danger, it may ruthlessly eliminate competition 
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thereby maiming the operational capacity of the formerly existing 
orders or replacing them altogether with its own. But, it may also 
adapt itself to the local context and draw benefits from its own 
flexibility, while the local culture, transforming, evolves. At some 
point, the  ‘import’ changes so far that in itself it would be foreign 
to the culture of its origin, while the acceptor culture has evolved 
to such a point, when it defines its own identity in a fashion in which 
the now-transformed ‘import’ is an obviews part of the local land-
scape. Apparently, Darwinism applies to desiring-machines, which 
begs the question of whether anything that has transformed itself 
in the local context initiating the evolution of this context may indeed 
be considered as an ‘import,’ and, if not, if it can be decoded as such, 
if the overall code/language/narrative has evolved?
By the same token, would the Polish blues, whose heyday coin-
cided with the aura of hopelessness of the Polish 1980s, and which, 
since then, followed an altogether different developmental path 
than the blues in the United States, be considered an ‘import’? 
An ‘American imprint’? Even though originally it used to be foreign, 
today it is a unique cultural phenomenon in the scale of the world, 
and few musicians world-wide would fail to appreciate its special 
character. Moreover, as a consequence, the idea of what the blues 
is has evolved, inspiring international artists, including Americans, 
to continue redefining it. How then can the Polish blues culture 
be read in terms of ‘decoding’ American cultures, if it no longer is 
American, and in itself becomes an ‘import’ to America, carried over 
by American bluesmen who have had the experience of playing with 
their Polish colleagues? It is ‘a notes’ and ‘the notes’ at the same 
time, as long as we choose to adopt optics that will allow us to forego 
the inherited vision of cultural borders as defense lines, guarded 
by armed soldiers, and finally see the shark in the otherwise non-
de-fin-able greenness of the rectangle.
Finally, to reduce the problem at stake to the most obvious examples, 
allow me to pose a few more ‘unanswerable’ questions: is the oeu-
vre of Isaac Bashevis Singer to be ‘decoded’ as a part of American 
culture in Israel? In Poland? Or perhaps as a part of the Polish culture 
in Israel? In America? Or maybe as a part of the Israeli culture in the US 
or in Poland? Did Emory Elliott include Gabriel García Márquez 
























understood the meaning of the word Columbia? Would NASA be 
able to construct space shuttles without Sir Isaac Newton? Is his 
physics to be ‘decoded’ as an element of English culture in the global 
context? Are we not jumping the shark by seeking to ‘decode’ what 
may never have been coded? Is the idea so obvius to us that we 
refuse to see mechanisms of culture as obviews?
an optical cod(e/a): avoiding yucatan
‘Eyes’
Kriben Pillay
I remember your eyes
when they spoke of me,
of my race, of my god
of the way I danced. 
They were not your eyes,
but the eyes of years gone by,
shaped by sights of images
too big to see,
and left alone...
in the dark. 
Those eyes, archaic,
of years gone by,
had to be plucked,
and in the unwanting sockets,
I put
mine in yours,
yours in mine. 
I remember my eyes now,
when they spoke of you,
of your race, of your god,
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